Skip to main content
← Back to Demos
LNK Abuse intermediate · 15 min

E4del and PINHOLE RATs Ride FTP-Banner Dead Drops in a ZIP + Shortcut (LNK) Chain (SOCRadar) — Deep CDR Strips the Shortcut's Download-and-Execute Logic (2026-09-14 CISO Daily Digest)

The 2026-09-14 CISO Daily Digest covered SOCRadar's hunt into a new Windows infection chain (first observed by MalwareHunterTeam in July 2026): phishing drops a ZIP archive whose only visible content is a document-themed Windows shortcut — and the shortcut doesn't open a document. It connects to an attacker-run FTP server and treats the FTP welcome banner, the text a server sends as a pre-login greeting, as a dead-drop resolver (DDR): it executes the command text found there and pulls the next stage. SOCRadar's infrastructure view: the banner at 157.254.194[.]31:21 chains to a second banner at 167.148.41[.]164:21, whose PowerShell stage downloads, extracts and runs the final binary; PINHOLE's banner at 209.99.185[.]38:21 uses the MSXML2.XMLHTTP COM object to fetch its script from cloudflare.milicare[.]in. The chain ends in two previously undocumented RATs: E4del — a Node.js implant packed inside a digitally signed Electron application masquerading as Discord, with persistent/temporary shells, screenshot capture, desktop streaming over WebSockets, privilege escalation and download-and-execute of follow-on payloads; and PINHOLE — a stealthier 14-command multi-stage RAT (file upload/download, process control, screenshots, browser-credential theft) that resolves its C2 from Pinterest posts and SurveyMonkey surveys and relays through Cloudflare Workers. It is the first documented in-the-wild use of FTP banners as a dead-drop resolver, and the shortcut carries no payload bytes at all — the instructions live in pre-login banner text that looks like protocol politeness. This demo ships the Linux analog of that shortcut: malicious-shortcut.desktop, a document-themed launcher whose Exec line fetches a harmless page (IANA-reserved example.com — never a real payload) and pipes it to the shell, then opens the calculator as the visible impact; clean-shortcut.desktop is the same shortcut after Deep CDR processing, pointing at the local document viewer only. Even offline, only the harmless visible impact (the calculator) ever triggers — nothing destructive runs. Deep CDR parses the shortcut, removes the embedded command logic and rebuilds a clean shortcut, breaking the fetch-and-execute chain before it starts — exactly what the same digest's OPSWAT section recommends for ZIP/LNK delivery chains (MITRE ATT&CK T1204.002 — User Execution: Malicious File, the sub-technique MITRE explicitly lists .lnk under).

Attack Technique

Document-themed shortcut (LNK / Linux .desktop analog) delivered inside a ZIP archive — the shortcut reads its next command from an FTP-server welcome banner used as a dead-drop resolver and runs a download-and-execute stage that ends in the E4del and PINHOLE RATs; the demo ships the same construct as a Linux .desktop shortcut whose Exec line fetches and pipes a benign string before opening the calculator, so Deep CDR can strip the embedded logic (T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File)

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 ↗

Platforms

linux

File Types

.desktop

MetaDefender Capabilities

Deep CDR

Incident Coverage

This attack technique maps to a real-world security incident — read the daily digest for details: Read the incident digest ↗

--- ---